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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
This is the second time we have been asked to r esolve 
issues stemming from divorce and custody proceedings 
involving Peter and Pamela Hughes. In this appeal, Peter J. 
Hughes challenges the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment, dismissing his civil rights claims under 42 
U.S.C. SS 1983 & 1985 and his state law claims against 
defendants Lynn Long and Patrick McHugh. Hughes argues 
that the District Court erroneously granted defendants 
absolute prosecutorial and witness immunity for his civil 
rights claims and that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's 
recent decision in LLMD of Michigan, Inc. v. Jackson-Cross 
Co., 559 Pa. 297, 740 A.2d 186 (Pa. 1999), pr ecludes 
immunity for his state law claims. We affir m the District 
Court's dismissal of Hughes's civil rights claims, although 
for reasons different from those set forth by the District 
Court;1 we also affirm the District Court's dismissal of 
Hughes's state law claims because we predict that, if faced 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We may affirm a District Court's judgment on grounds other than 
those considered by the District Court itself. See, e.g., Guthrie v. Lady 
Jane Collieries, Inc., 722 F.2d 1141, 1145 n. 1 (3d Cir. 1983) ("An 
appellate court may affirm a result r eached by the District Court on 
different reasons, as long as the record supports the judgment."); PAAC 
v. Rizzo, 502 F.2d 306, 308 n. 1 (3d Cir . 1974) ("It is proper for an 
appellate court to affirm a correct decision of a lower court even when 
that decision is based on an inappropriate gr ound."). 
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with the issue, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not 




Hughes's claims against Long and McHugh stem fr om an 
acrimonious child custody proceeding that took place in the 
Court of Common Pleas of Chester County between Hughes 
and his former wife, Pamela Hughes. The custody dispute 
began when, in the midst of her divorce fr om Hughes, 
Pamela filed a Petition for Temporary Custody of the 
children. In response to this Petition, the court scheduled 
a Conciliation Conference before a Custody Conciliator. The 
Custody Conciliator recommended that appellee Long, a 
licensed clinical social worker, conduct a full custody 
evaluation. The court adopted this recommendation, 
ordering Hughes and Pamela to participate in psychological 
evaluations with Long. According to the or der, Long was to 
report the results of the psychological evaluations to the 
court and make any recommendations appr opriate to a 
child custody determination. Although the court appointed 
Long to conduct the evaluation, Long entered into a private 
contract with the parties whereby each agr eed to pay fifty 
percent of her fee. 
 
In accordance with the court's order , Long conducted the 
evaluation. She interviewed Hughes, Pamela, the children, 
and others. She also referred Hughes and Pamela to 
Kathleen Lacey, a psychologist who worked with Long in 
her custody evaluations, for psychological testing. Because 
Lacey was not licensed at the time of the evaluations, she 
practiced under the supervision of appellee McHugh, a 
licensed clinical psychologist. McHugh did not dir ectly 
supervise the tests administered by Lacey, but he did 
review the results and approved her r ecommendations. 
 
It is not clear what occurred at the conclusion of the 
psychological testing. Apparently, after completing the 
psychological tests, Long informally told Hughes her 
custody recommendation for the children. For reasons 
unexplained, Hughes was dissatisfied with this 
recommendation and therefore he hir ed his own expert, Dr. 
Gerald Cooke, to evaluate the results of the tests that Long 
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and Lacey administered. According to Hughes, Long and 
Lacey refused to give Dr. Cooke the information upon which 
they based their conclusions, despite repeated requests and 
a court order. Hughes claims that, rather than complying, 
Long fabricated new data to support her report and that 
Lacey and McHugh produced new psychological tests and 
results that were more favorable toward Pamela. He 
contends that Long, Lacey, and McHugh gave these false 
reports to Dr. Cooke and destroyed the original data. 
 
During the custody hearing, Hughes presented his 
allegations of fraudulent behavior by Long, Lacey, and 
McHugh. All three testified during the hearing and denied 
creating false reports, destroying any originals, or 
intentionally failing to comply with the court's or der to 
release their raw data. Long testified in person and the 
depositions of Lacey and McHugh were read. Despite 
Hughes's allegations of fraud, the court adopted Long's 
formal recommendation and awarded joint custody to 
Hughes and Pamela. 
 
Hughes appealed the order of joint custody to the 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania but later withdr ew the 
appeal. After abandoning his state court appeal, hefiled 
suit against the appellees2 in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging 
interference with his familial rights in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. 
SS 1983 and 1985(3). Hughes also alleged the following 
state law violations: (1) abuse of legal process; (2) 
defamation, false light, and invasion of privacy; (3) civil 
conspiracy; (4) fraud; (5) tortious interfer ence with familial 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Along with Long and McHugh, Hughes also filed suit against Lacey 
and Judge MacElree, who presided over the underlying custody 
proceeding in the Chester County Court of Common Pleas. Lacey, 
however, refused to file a response to his complaint and, therefore, the 
District Court entered a default judgment against her. Judge MacElree 
filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that he was entitled to absolute 
judicial immunity. The District Court granted his motion to dismiss and, 
on appeal, we affirmed. See Hughes v. MacElree, 1997 WL 733609, at *1 
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 168 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 
1998). As such, neither Lacey nor Judge MacElr ee are parties to this 
appeal. 
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relations; (6) breach of contract; and (7) breach of implied 
contract. In response to Hughes's complaint, appellees filed 
their respective motions to dismiss. The District Court 
granted those motions on the basis of the Rooker -Feldman 
doctrine, which holds that a federal court does not have 
subject-matter jurisdiction to review the final adjudications 
of a state's highest court or to evaluate constitutional 
claims that are inextricably intertwined with the state 
court's custody proceeding. In dismissing Hughes's claims, 
the court relied solely on this doctrine and did not rule on 
appellees' arguments that they are entitled to absolute 
prosecutorial immunity pursuant to our decision in Ernst v. 
Child & Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 486 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
On appeal, we reversed the District Court with respect to 
its holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine warranted a 
dismissal of Hughes's claims. See Hughes v. MacElree, 168 
F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1998). We also refused to affirm the 
dismissal of Hughes's complaint on the alter native basis 
that Long and McHugh are entitled to absolute 
prosecutorial immunity under Ernst . We found that an 
evidentiary record of appellees' pr ecise functions with 
respect to their participation in the underlying custody case 
had not been developed. 
 
On remand, Long and McHugh filed a motion for 
summary judgment, reasserting their argument that they 
are entitled to prosecutorial immunity under Ernst. The 
District Court granted Long's and McHugh's motions, 
agreeing that they are entitled to absolute prosecutorial 
immunity from Hughes's SS 1983 and 1985 claims. 
Alternatively, the court held that Long and McHugh were 
entitled to witness immunity. The court also held that 
under Pennsylvania law, Long and McHugh were entitled to 
immunity from Hughes's supplemental state law claims. On 




Hughes first argues that the District Court erred by 
holding that Long and McHugh are entitled to absolute 
prosecutorial immunity pursuant to our holding in Ernst. 
He argues that appellees did not function as"advocates" for 
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the "state" like prosecutors and child welfare workers. 
Further, he argues that, in contrast to prosecutors and 
child welfare workers who initiate criminal and dependency 
proceedings, appellees did not initiate the custody 
proceedings. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291 and exercise plenary review over a District Court's 
grant of summary judgment. See Mardell v. Harleysville Life 
Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1224 (3d Cir . 1994). 
 
Section 1983 provides that "[e]very person who, under 
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State . . . subjects . . . any citizen of the 
United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws shall be liable to the party injured." 42 U.S.C. S 1983. 
On its face, it contains no defense of official immunity. In 
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376, 71 S.Ct. 783, 788 
(1951), however, the Supreme Court held that Congress did 
not intend S 1983 to abrogate immunities"well grounded in 
history and reason." In determining whether an immunity 
meets this standard, a court must first deter mine whether 
"an official was accorded immunity fr om tort actions at 
common law when the Civil Rights Act was enacted in 
1871." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 
1095 (1986). If a common-law counterpart is found, a court 
must next determine whether S 1983's history or purposes 
nonetheless discourage recognition of the same immunity 
in S 1983 actions. See id. 
 
Even if an official did not enjoy absolute immunity at 
common law, she may still be entitled to immunity if she 
performs "special functions" that are similar or analogous 
to functions that would have been immune when Congr ess 
enacted S 1983. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 406, 
98 S.Ct. 2894, 2911 (1978). This "functional appr oach" 
looks to the nature of the function per formed, not the 
identity of the actor who performed it and evaluates the 
effect that exposure to particular for ms of liability would 
likely have on the appropriate exercise of that function. See 
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224, 108 S.Ct. 538, 542 
(1988). The official seeking immunity bears the burden of 
showing that it is justified by the function in question. See 
id. 
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Under its historical and functional approach, the 
Supreme Court has recognized the defense of absolute 
immunity from civil rights suits in several well-established 
contexts involving the judicial process. This immunity has 
given functionaries in the judicial system the ability to 
perform their tasks and apply their discretion without the 
threat of retaliatory S 1983 litigation. Thus, a judge acting 
in his judicial capacity is absolutely immune fr om suits, 
unless he acts without any colorable claim of jurisdiction. 
See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S.Ct. 
1099, 1104-05 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553- 
55, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1217-18 (1967). Witnesses, including 
public officials and private citizens, are immune from civil 
damages based upon their testimony. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 
460 U.S. 325, 341, 345-46, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 1118, 1120-21 
(1983). The Court has also granted absolute immunity to 
prosecutors for activities that are "intimately associated 
with the judicial process" such as initiating and pursuing a 
criminal prosecution and presenting the state's case in 
court. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, 
994-95 (1976). A prosecutor's administrative and 
investigative duties, however, are not immune. See id. at 
430-31, 96 S.Ct. at 994-96. 
 
We have provided social workers absolute immunity for 
actions involving the initiation and prosecution of child 
custody or dependency proceedings. In Er nst v. Child & 
Youth Servs. of Chester County, 108 F .3d 486 (3d Cir. 
1997), we held that child welfare workers ar e entitled to 
absolute immunity for their actions on behalf of the state in 
preparing for, initiating, and pr osecuting dependency 
proceedings, and that this immunity was br oad enough to 
include the formulation and presentation of 
recommendations to the court in the course of the 
proceedings. In reaching this conclusion, we first reasoned 
that, similar to prosecutors who are r esponsible for the 
initiation of criminal proceedings, child welfare workers are 
responsible for bringing dependency proceedings and must 
exercise independent judgement in deter mining when to 
bring such proceedings. We also noted that, like 
prosecutors, child welfare workers often have to make 
decisions in a short amount of time and with limited 
information. See id. at 495-96. 
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Additionally, we explained that child services workers are 
like prosecutors because they are " `advocates for the 
State' " and serve in a function " `intimately associated with 
the judicial phase of the [child protection] process.' " Id. 
(quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31 n.33, 96 S.Ct. at 995, 
996 n.33). Specifically, we noted that child welfare workers 
are directly responsible for r ecommendations made to the 
court in dependency proceedings and for their actions in 
determining those recommendations and communicating 
them to the court. We concluded that this dir ect 
responsibility was similar to a prosecutor's in criminal 
prosecutions. See id. 
 
Next, we reasoned that public policy considerations 
support absolute immunity for child welfare workers. See 
id. We noted that the fear of personal liability would 
compromise a worker's independent judgement, r endering 
her overly cautious in dangerous situations where 
immediate action on behalf of a child is needed. W e also 
noted that the likelihood of suits in retaliation for the 
initiation of dependency proceedings was gr eat, given a 
parent's predictable resentment of state interference in the 
parent-child relationship. Finally, in concluding that child 
welfare workers deserve absolute immunity, we r ecognized 
that alternative mechanisms exist to pr event 
unconstitutional conduct by child welfare workers. These 
mechanisms include appellate review of a judge's decision 
in a dependency hearing and agency supervision of a child 
welfare worker. See id. 
 
Here, the District Court held that the functions of Long 
and McHugh in the child custody proceeding wer e similar 
to roles of prosecutors and child welfar e workers. According 
to the court, even though Long and McHugh wer e initially 
impartial fact-finders, once they arrived at a 
recommendation they became "de facto advocates for their 
recommendations." We disagree and hold that Long and 
McHugh enjoy judicial immunity because they acted as 
"arms of the court," similar to a guar dian ad litem or a 
court-appointed doctor or psychologist, a non-judicial 
person who fulfills a quasi-judicial role at the court's 
request. 
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To explain our analysis, we must examine the precise 
functions of Long and McHugh in the custody pr oceedings. 
As indicated above, Long was the court-appointed custody 
evaluator. In that role, she interviewed Hughes, his former 
wife, their children, and other relevant parties. She also 
administered parenting tests to Hughes and his former wife 
and sent them to Lacey for psychological testing. As 
directed by the court, Long made a recommendation 
regarding a custody arrangement for the Hughes children. 
McHugh's role was slightly differ ent. He was not appointed 
by the court, but as Lacey's supervisor, he r eviewed and 
verified the psychological test results and the reports Lacey 
prepared for Long. Thus, he assisted in the completion of 
Long's testing, which was an essential and primary 
component of Long's recommendation. Without his 
assistance, Long could not have completed the court- 
ordered psychological evaluations. Like Long, McHugh also 
reported his findings to the court. 
 
Although Long and McHugh acted like prosecutors and 
child welfare workers in formulating and presenting 
recommendations to the court, their roles differed in other 
significant respects. Most notably, Long and McHugh did 
not initiate the custody proceeding. Indeed, the court 
appointed Long after the proceeding began and, thus, Long 
had no discretion to initiate or "pr osecute" the custody 
proceeding. Similarly, McHugh only became involved after 
the proceedings began. 
 
Next, in formulating and making their r ecommendations 
to the court, Long and McHugh were not "advocates of the 
State" like prosecutors and child welfar e workers. Rather 
than making arguments, Long and McHugh mer ely offered 
their opinions, based upon fact-gathering, in or der to aid 
and inform the family court. Long's contract states: 
"[w]henever possible, I make every reasonable attempt to 
serve as a court appointed impartial examiner , rather than 
an advocate in custody litigation." J.A. at 1695. Thus, Long 
and McHugh functioned more like witnesses or assistants 
to the court than advocates. 
 
Finally, although not a dispositive differ ence, Long and 
McHugh were not acting under any time constraints and 
were not forced to make any "snap judgments" based on 
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incomplete information, as is often the case with 
prosecutors and child welfare workers. Rather, Long and 
McHugh took six months to complete their evaluations and 
did so in a deliberate, methodical, and thor ough fashion. 
Although the District Court discounts this dif ference, we 
expressly recognized it as a factor in holding that child 
welfare workers are analogous to pr osecutors in Ernst. See 
108 F.3d at 496.3 
 
Although not cloaked in prosecutorial immunity, Long 
and McHugh are entitled to judicial immunity because they 
acted as "arms of the court" and per formed functions 
integral to the judicial process. Specifically, the court 
appointed Long to gather information, conduct an 
evaluation, and make a recommendation to aid the custody 
determination. McHugh, although not dir ectly appointed, 
was indirectly assigned this task because his r eview of the 
court-ordered psychological evaluations was necessary for 
their completion. In essence, Long's and McHugh's 
functions were to engage in neutral fact-finding and advise 
the court. These functions are intimately r elated and 
essential to the judicial process because they aid and 
inform the court in its discretionary duties. In the absence 
of the extensive fact-finding and recommendations of child- 
custody evaluators, courts would be requir ed to make 
custody recommendations with little, if any, unbiased 
information about the family. Given this integral 
relationship to the court, we hold that Long and McHugh 
are entitled to judicial immunity. 
 
Long's and McHugh's similarity to a guardian ad litem, 
an individual who enjoys judicial immunity, supports this 
conclusion. A guardian ad litem is a person appointed by 
the court in custody proceedings to serve as an investigator 
and gather information about the parents and the children 
and report back to the court recommending which parent 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Moreover, the public policy considerations enumerated by the District 
Court are an insufficient basis for granting prosecutorial absolute 
immunity. Courts "do not have license to establish immunities from 
S 1983 actions in the interests of what[they] judge to be sound public 
policy." Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 278, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 
2618 (1993). 
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should receive custody. See Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 
3 (1st Cir. 1989) ("A GAL typically gathers information, 
prepares a report and makes a r ecommendation to the 
court regarding a custody disposition."); Raven C. Lidman, 
The Guardian Ad Litem in Child Custody Cases: The 
Contours of Our Judicial System Stretched Beyond 
Recognition, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 256 (1998) (same). 
Characterized as "agents" of the court, Cok, 876 F.2d at 2- 
3, and "actual functionar[ies] or ar m[s] of the court," 
guardian ad litems aid and inform the court. Gardner v. 
Parson, 874 F.2d 131, 146 (3d Cir . 1989) ("[a] guardian ad 
litem would be immune in exercising such functions as . . . 
making reports and recommendations to the court in which 
the guardian acts as an actual functionary or arm of the 
court."). Because of this intimate relationship to the court 
and the judicial process, several courts have held that 
when performing certain delegated duties, guardian ad 
litems are entitled to absolute judicial immunity. See 
Gardner, 874 F.2d at 145; Cok , 876 F.2d at 2-3; see also 
Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437 (8th Cir . 1987), rev'd on 
different grounds, Bur ns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 111 S.Ct. 
1934 (1991). Given the striking similarities between the 
functions of Long and McHugh and the functions of a 
guardian ad litem, Long and McHugh are entitled to the 
same judicial immunity. 
 
Moreover, Long and McHugh perfor med functions similar 
to court-appointed doctors and psychiatrists, who have also 
received absolute judicial immunity. For example, in 
McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F .2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1992), we held 
that a prison doctor who conducted a psychiatric exam on 
an inmate at the request of the court had absolute judicial 
and witness immunity. Specifically, we reasoned that the 
psychiatrist's conduct in completing the exam and 
furnishing a written report to the court at the request was 
entitled to absolute judicial immunity because the 
psychiatrist was "functioning as an arm of the court." Id. at 
1085. We also held that the psychiatrist's r eport and 
recommendation to the court constituted testimony 
protected by absolute witness immunity. 
 
Similarly, in Moses v. Parwatikar, 813 F .2d 891 (8th Cir. 
1987), the Eighth Circuit granted absolute judicial and 
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witness immunity to a psychiatrist appointed by the court 
to conduct a competency evaluation. The psychiatrist's 
appointed duties consisted of examining the plaintif f and 
reporting his findings to the court. The court held that 
these duties were "functions essential to the judicial 
process." Id. at 892. It went on to state that the 
psychiatrist's function was analogous to a witness in a 
judicial proceeding. Accordingly, the court granted absolute 
immunity to ensure that the " `paths which lead to the 
ascertainment of truth . . . be left as free and unobstructed 
as possible.' " Id. (quoting Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 
333, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 1114 (1983)). 
 
Finally, in Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dep't of Social 
Servs., 812 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit 
granted absolute judicial immunity to counselors employed 
by a family court. The counselors' duties included 
mediation of custody and visitation disputes, investigating 
matters pertaining to such disputes, and providing reports 
to the court. The Ninth Circuit affir med the District Court's 
holding that the counselors were "officers of the court," 
reasoning that they were "perfor ming a judicial function at 
the direction of the court." Id. at 1159. Given the nature of 
their duties, the counselors were granted "quasi-judicial" 
immunity. 
 
These cases are factually identical to ours and support 
our conclusion that Long and McHugh are entitled to 
judicial rather than prosecutorial immunity. Accordingly, 
we affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment 
motion in favor of Long and McHugh dismissing Hughes's 




Hughes next contends that the Pennsylvania Supr eme 
Court's holding in LLMD of Michigan, Inc. v. Jackson-Cross 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Because we hold that judicial immunity insulates the entirety of 
Long's and McHugh's conduct from liability pr emised on alleged SS 1983 
& 1985 violations, we need not address the District Court's alternative 
holding that Long and McHugh are entitled to summary judgment based 
on witness immunity. 
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Co., 559 Pa. 297, 740 A.2d 186 (Pa. 1999), which was 
decided several days after the District Court's ruling, 
suggests that Long and McHugh are not entitled to witness 
immunity for his state law claims. He asks us to r eview 
their immunity claims in light of LLMD, which holds that 
witness immunity does not bar professional malpractice 
actions against private experts who negligently for mulate 
their opinions. See LLMD, 559 Pa. at 306, 740 A.2d at 191. 
Based on LLMD, he asks us to predict that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court will extend the exception to 
court-appointed experts and causes of action outside of 
negligence. Given the unique and essential r ole of court- 
appointed witnesses, we believe that, if faced with the 
issue, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would confine its 
holding in LLMD to privately retained experts sued for 
professional malpractice. 
 
In predicting how a matter would be decided under state 
law we examine: (1) what the Pennsylvania Supr eme Court 
has said in related areas; (2) the decisional law of the 
Pennsylvania intermediate courts; (3) federal appeals and 
district court cases interpreting state law; and (4) decisions 
from other jurisdictions that have discussed the issues we 
face here. See Boyanowski v. Capital Ar ea Intermediate 
Unit, 215 F.3d 396, 406 (3d Cir. 2000). As the appellant 
indicates, LLMD provides the most r ecent statement from 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the witness immunity 
doctrine and its contours. 
 
In LLMD, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court carved out an 
exception to the state's long standing principle that 
communications which are "issued in the r egular course of 
judicial proceedings and which are pertinent and material 
to the redress or relief sought" are immune from civil 
liability. Post v. Mendel, 510 Pa. 213, 221, 507 A.2d 351, 
355 (Pa. 1986). LLMD involved an expert witness hired by 
a plaintiff to calculate and testify r egarding his lost profits 
resulting from a breach of contract. During cross- 
examination of the plaintiff 's expert, defense counsel 
established that the expert's lost profits calculation 
contained an error that completely under mined the basis 
for the damage amount. Because the expert had not 
calculated the damages himself, he was unable to correct 
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the error and, as a result, the trial judge struck his 
testimony. The day after the expert's testimony was 
stricken, the plaintiff accepted a settlement offer of 
$750,000. Subsequently, the expert provided a corrected 
computation of lost profits that indicated $2.7 million in 
damages. The plaintiff then filed a suit against the expert, 
asserting causes of action for breach of contract and 
professional malpractice; the expert claimed immunity 
under the witness immunity doctrine. See LLMD , 559 Pa. at 
187-189, 740 A.2d at 299-301. 
 
Before ruling on the expert's defense, the LLMD court 
reviewed the public policy considerations underlying the 
judicial and witness immunity doctrines. The court stated, 
" `[t]he privilege is also extended to parties to afford freedom 
of access to the courts, to witnesses to encourage their 
complete and unintimidated testimony in court, and to 
counsel to enable him to best represent his client's 
interests.' " Id. at 189, 740 A.2d at 302 (quoting Binder v. 
Triangle Publ'n, Inc. 275 A.2d 53 (1971)). Quoting extensive 
language from Briscoe v. LaHue, the Supreme Court's 
seminal witness immunity case, the court also explained 
that " `a witness who knows that he might be forced to 
defend a subsequent lawsuit, and perhaps to pay damages, 
might be inclined to shade his testimony in favor of the 
potential plaintiff, to magnify uncertainties, and thus to 
deprive the fact finder of fact of candid, objective, and 
undistorted evidence.' " Id. (quoting Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 
U.S. 325, 103 S.Ct. 1108 (1983)). 
 
The court recognized the continuing significance of these 
policy concerns but nonetheless concluded that extending 
witness immunity to actions arising from the negligent 
formulation of an opinion would not addr ess these 
concerns. See id. at 191, 740 A.2d at 306. Rather, allowing 
liability for this sort of negligence would enhance the 
judicial process "by requiring that an expert render services 
to the degree of care, skill and pr oficiency commonly 
exercised by the ordinarily skillful, car eful and prudent 
members of their profession." Id. The court, however, was 
careful to point out the limits of its holding. It stressed that 
experts were still immune from liability premised on the 
substance of an expert's opinion. Further , the court 
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explained that an expert witness may not be held liable 
simply because his or her opinion is challenged by another 
expert or authoritative source. See id. Additionally, the 
court noted that because the sole issue befor e it was the 
liability of private experts, its opinion did not address 
exceptions to the witness immunity doctrine for court- 
appointed witnesses. See id. at 301 n.4, 740 A.2d at 188 
n.4. 
 
Although the LLMD court did not expr essly prohibit the 
applicability of its exception to witness immunity to court- 
appointed witnesses, we believe that, if faced with the 
issue, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not disturb 
the complete immunity that court-appointed witnesses 
currently enjoy. See, e.g., Clodgo v. Clodgo, 411 Pa. Super. 
267, 601 A.2d 342 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that 
witness immunity doctrine insulates a court-appointed 
witness from liability premised upon medical malpractice). 
Our conclusion is largely premised on the differences 
between privately retained experts, which wer e at issue in 
LLMD, and court-appointed experts, which ar e at issue in 
this case. As we emphasized earlier, court-appointed 
experts hold a unique role in judicial pr oceedings. Because 
they work on behalf of the court rather than any one party, 
court-appointed experts provide unbiased, neutral 
information and recommendations and aid the court in its 
decision-making process. This neutral infor mation is 
essential to the court, which cannot make necessary 
observations and gather relevant facts without assistance. 
Thus, it is crucial to the judicial process that court- 
appointed witnesses are free to for mulate and make 
recommendations unhindered by the fear of liability. 
Without such immunity, these "advisors" may be reluctant 
to assist the court, thereby depriving the court of its sole 
source of neutral information. 
 
While privately retained experts also pr ovide information 
to the court, they differ in that they enter into a private 
contract with a party and typically receive compensation for 
their testimony from that party. Therefor e, to some extent, 
they are expected to provide a recommendation that favors 
their client. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B) (requiring a party 
to disclose information concerning its expert witness 
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including the compensation to be paid for the study and 
testimony and a listing of any other cases in which the 
witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition 
within the preceding four years); United States v. 412.93 
Acres of Land, 455 F.2d 1242, 1247 (3d Cir. 1972) (holding 
that the District Court properly permitted the introduction 
of an expert witness's per diem fee in order to show his 
possible bias); Michelle Morgan Ketchum, Experts: 
Witnesses for the Persecution? Establishing an Expert 
Witness's Bias Through the Discovery and Admission of 
Financial Records, 63 UMKC L. REV. 133, 157-59 (1994) 
(discussing the legal community's general distrust of expert 
witnesses and the resulting discovery r equests for discovery 
of an expert witness's financial recor ds in order to establish 
interest, bias, or prejudice). Although private experts serve 
an important role and aid the court in "its path to truth," 
they are not neutral "advisors" to the court and thus 
should not be subject to the same treatment as court- 
appointed experts. In sum, the significant and distinct 
advisory role of court-appointed experts persuades us that 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will continue to afford 
them full immunity, despite its exception in LLMD. 
 
Moreover, we believe that LLMD's exception to immunity 
for the negligent formulation of an opinion is confined to 
privately retained experts because they owe their clients a 
duty of reasonable care by virtue of their contractual 
relationship. As explained by the LLMD court, the purpose 
of its witness immunity exception is to ensur e that expert 
witnesses "render services to the degr ee of care, skill and 
proficiency commonly exercised by the or dinarily skillful, 
careful and prudent members of their pr ofession." LLMD, 
559 Pa. at 307, 740 A.2d at 191. Here, we have neither a 
private expert nor a cause of action for professional 
malpractice, both of which compelled the exception in 
LLMD. Rather we have a court-appointed witness whose 
role in the judicial proceedings dif fers from a private expert. 
Further, we have state law claims for abuse of legal 
process, defamation, false light, invasion of privacy, civil 
conspiracy, fraud, tortious interference with familial 
relations, breach of contract, and br each of implied 
contract, which do not parallel a cause of action for 
negligence. Therefore, we believe that LLMD's exception to 
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the witness immunity doctrine has limited applicability and 
does not abrogate Long's and McHugh's immunity from 




In sum, Long's and McHugh's duties were similar to 
those of a guardian ad litem or court-appointed psychiatrist 
or doctor, both of whom are "agents" or "arms" of the court. 
Therefore, we will affirm the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment with respect to appellant'sSS 1983 and 
1985 claims on the basis of judicial immunity. Mor eover, 
we affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment 
with respect to appellant's state law claims because we 
believe that, if faced with the issue, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court will not extend LLMD's exception to witness 
immunity to court-appointed witnesses. 
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